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Several federal courts have recently upheld criminal prosecutions
under the federal false statements statute1 for statements made to the
Federal Bureau of Investigation in its role as criminal investigator. No
doubt the courts were well-intentioned: they may have hoped to con-
serve the resources of the FBI by minimizing useless activities initiated
on the basis of false information, or they may have desired to protect
innocent third parties from false complaints or statements made to the
FBI. These decisions, however, radically expand the use of Section 1001
of the Criminal Code beyond what Congress intended and raise serious
questions about the extent to which lying-even lying to government
officials-ought to be punished criminally.
I. History of Section 1001
The Federal government has long legislated against fraud by those
whom it regulates or with whom it does business. As early as 1863,2 a
False Claims Act was enacted that prohibited knowing use of false
vouchers to obtain government funds. This Act was codified as Sec-
tion 35 of the Criminal Code and was amended in 1918 to penalize false
statements made "for the purpose and intent of cheating and swindling
or defrauding the government."3 In 1926, however, the Supreme Court
limited the scope of the 1918 amendment to frauds involving "the
wrongful obtaining of money and other property of the Government."4
Responding partially to the Court-imposed restriction and partially
1. § 1001. Statements or entries generally.
Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of theUnited States knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals or Covers up by any trick,scheme, or device a material fact, or makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent state.ments or representations, or makes or uses any false writing or document knowingthe same to contain any false, fictitious or fraudulent statement or entry, shall befined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1964).
2. Act of March 2, 1863, ch. 67, 12 Stat. 696.
3. Act of Oct. 23, 1918, ch. 194, § 35, 40 Stat. 1015.4. United States v. Cohn, 270 U.S. 339 (1926). The Court read the Act's phrase "de-frauding the government" as restricted to "the wrongful obtaining of money and otherproperty of the Government," with no reference to the impairment of governmentfunctions. Cohn was acquitted of making false statements on a bond given a customsinspector for release of a shipment of foreign merchandise, because this Infractioninvolved only the hampering of a government function and not the loss of goverment
property.
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to the New Deal's delegation of important responsibilities to govern-
ment administrative agencies, Congress amended the law in 1934 to
cover deception of government departments generally. But Congress'
intent was quite narrow. In passing what became Section 1001, it in-
tended to safeguard the final decisions of the new federal regulatory
agencies by punishing the submission of false information on which
the agencies' decisions must rest. Section 1001 was never intended to
address the problem of false statements made to a government investi-
gator during an investigation.
The 1934 amendments originated in the efforts of the Interior De-
partment to reach
a large number of cases involving the shipment of "hot" oil, where
false papers are presented in connection therewith, and also those
cases within the Public Works Administration where contractors
are performing work payable from the Public Works Adminis-
tration appropriation, and false certificates are made as to the
actual wages which are paid ....
During the debate on the bill which emerged from the Senate Judiciary
Committee, Senator Ashurst explained that it was designed to allow
prosecution of the "obscene harpies [and] foul buzzards" who "know-
ingly make false certificates and supply fictitious bids" to every depart-
ment of the Government." President Roosevelt vetoed the act for
reasons not relevant here,7 but when a subsequent House-passed
amendment to Section 358 reached the Senate, the Judiciary Committee
incorporated the protections desired by the Department of the Inte-
rior,9 using language similar to the vetoed bill. The amended provisions
were approved by both houses of Congress0 and in 1948 were recodified
5. Letter from Secretary of the Interior to Senate Judiciary Committee, S. REP. No.
1202, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1934).
6. 78 CoNG. REc. 2858 (1934). Originally designed to protect the agence of the
Interior Department, the bill was amended on the Senate floor to include statements
made to "any department or agency of the United States."
7. 78 CoNG. REc. 6778-79 (1934).
8. 78 CONG. REc. 8136-37 (1934).
9. The following explanation of the bill's purpose was offered when it was introduced
onto the Senate floor for debate:
There is nothing which permits us to make an investigation and prosecute persons
who are engaged in the "kick back" practice. They made false returns, claiming
they paid certain amounts to their employees, when they have not done so. This bill
just amends the law so as to give the Federal Government authority to deal with
that class of cases.
78 CONG. REc. 11270 (1934).
10. The measure was passed with minimal debate in the Senate, 78 CoNG. R c. 11271
(1934), and the Senate amendments were approved without debate in the House, 78
CONG. REc. 11513 (1934).
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as Section 1001 of the Criminal Code." While the Supreme Court has
interpreted the Section broadly, allowing prosecutions in cases involv-
ing informal oral statements12 and legislative as well as administrative
agencies,'3 the focus of both courts and prosecutors has been on state-
ments such as production reports and wage claims which are central
to the government's regulatory decisions and business transactions.
Both the original conception and the enforcement policy of 30 years
behind Section 1001 thus rest heavily on the narrow justification of
protecting the final determinations of government agencies. Recently,
however, Section 1001 has been applied to persons making statements
to government agents involved in criminal investigations. The Second
Circuit warmly embraced such use of Section 1001 recently in United
States v. Adler 4 without adequately considering the unfortunate con-
11. Various minor amendments of form and a reduction of the maximum imprison.
ment from ten to five years in 1948 produced the current Section 1001. At that time
the section was split so that false claims are covered by 18 U.S.C. § 287 and false
statements by 18 U.S.C. § 1001. The Supreme Court has held that this division implied
no substantive change in the statute. United States V. Bramblett, 348 U.S. 503 (1955).
The civil nature of the Section's goals is emphasized by the Reviser's Note to the 1948
amendment, which points out that the penalty was being reduced to conform to other
"comparable sections." The sections cited all involved false entries or actions in col-
lecting monetary claims on the government or in administering federally-insured financial
institutions-such criminally-oriented statutes as the perjury or misprision of felony
laws were not cited. H.R. RiEP. No. 304, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. A25, A81 (1948).
12. Marzani v. United States, 168 F.2d 133 (D.C. Cir. 1948), afi'd mern. by an equally
divided court, 335 U.S. 895 (1948) (Douglas, J., not sitting), involved false statements
made in an informal State Department interview regarding termination of employment.
The ambiguity over the word "statement" arose from a subtle difference between the
words of the original vetoed bill and those of Section 35 as finally amended. The original
bill prohibited the making or presentation of "any false or fraudulent affidavit, declara-
tion, certificate, vouchers, paper, or writing to be such," while the final wording simply
forbade "any false or fraudulent statements." There is no indication in the legislat ve
history that alteration in the wording was made for any but reasons of brevity. The follow-
ing exchange occurred during the House debate on the bill:
Mr. Eltse: It does not provide for false verbal testimony, then?
Mr. McKeown: No. That would be a different offense.
Mr. Eltse: If he appears before any board or commission or agency or administration,
as it is provided in this bill, and gives testimony that is false, why should it not apply
to him just the same as it does the man who makes a written bid?
Mr. McKeown: The trouble is, there is always a dispute as to whether he said it or
whether he did not, but when he puts it on paper, there is no dispute about it.
It is the purpose of the Department [of the Interior] to print this statute right on every
proposal so as to deter persons from getting into this trouble rather than punish them
after they get into it.
Mr. Eltse: If you are going to make the bill effective, why do you not extend It to
verbal testimony?
Mr. McKeown: It is an unheard of proposition to try to convict a man for a mere
statement unless he has testified under oath. If he has testified under oath, then there
is a penalty for this [under the perjury laws].
78 CONG. RIEc. 3724 (1934).
13. United States v. Bramblett, 348 U.S. 503 (1955) upheld a conviction under Section
1001 for false statements in pay voucher to the House Dispersing Office.
14. 380 F.2d 917 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1006 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting).
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sequences of such an unwarranted expansion of the statutes to cover
both false complaints made to the FBI15 and false statements made
during its investigations.
II. False Complaints Starting Investigations
The Adler case involved a false complaint to the FBI. The defen-
dant appeared at the New York office of the FBI and told an agent that
he hoped the Bureau would "reprimand" various government officials
who had solicited bribes from "a friend" in return for allowing the
continuation of the friend's federal construction project. The agent
elicited Adler's admission that the "friend" was actually Adler himself
and then warned the defendant of his right to silence. Adler refused
to make any further statement and remained silent throughout most
of the subsequent FBI and grand jury investigations of the matter.
More than two years after the original interview, two FBI agents were
in Adler's office checking his business records in connection with the
continuing inquiry; Adler again initiated a discussion of his difficulties
with his government contracts. The agents warned him of his right to
remain silent, but, in the words of the court, Adler
[w]ent on to say that the bribery accusation he had made in 1963
was false, that he had made the accusation to "get even" with the
government personnel handling his contract because they had been
giving him a "rough time," and that he had hoped that an investi-
gation by the FBI might keep the officials "off his back."10
The Second Circuit held that these facts established an offence un-
der Section 1001, since the statement was known to be false, was made
to a government agency, and concerned a matter within its jurisdic-
tion.
This conclusion is vulnerable to a number of challenges. In other
cases involving the use of the Section to police criminal investigations,
the element of falsity has been read strictly to require that it concern a
"material fact,"17 and some courts have restrictively defined a govern-
15. Although the FBI is usually the agency involved, special agents for other Govern-
ment bodies also conduct criminal investigations. Cf. note 47 infra.
16. 380 F.2d at 920.
17. United States v. Brandow, 268 F.2d 559 (9th Cir. 1959); Freidus v. United States.
223 F.2d 598 (D.C. Cir. 1955); United States v. Rice Growers Ass'n, 110 F. Supp. 667
(N.D. Cal. 1953); cf. United States v. Quirk, 167 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1958), aIl'd 266
F.2d 26 (3d Cir. 1959). In Brandow Judge Barnes of the Ninth Circuit observed that
"[t]his requirement of materiality has been described as essential by the greater weight
of authority ... " 268 F.2d at 565. But see United States v. Rinaldi. 393 F.2d 97 (2d
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ment "department or agency."18 But more important is the challenge
to the Adler concept of "jurisdiction" raised by cases such as Friedman
v. United States,19 an Eighth Circuit false complaint decision handed
down shortly before Adler.
In a written complaint to the FBI, Friedman stated that he had been
beaten while in the custody of the Missouri State Highway Patrol. As
the court of appeals noted, the patrolman admitted that he had "scuf-
fled" with Friedman, and Friedman had sustained "small, observable
injuries." But the resulting FBI investigation gave rise to no prosecu-
tion of the officer; instead, Friedman was indicted and convicted un-
der Section 1001.20
The court of appeals reversed. Judge Gibson held for the majority
that the alleged offence did not fall "within the jurisdiction" of the
FBI. The court pointed out that the purpose of Section 1001 was "to
contain the flow of false information to the newly created regulative
agencies," and that if "the Congress wanted unsworn statements to in-
vestigative officials to serve as the basis for severe criminal punishment,
... it would have said so in clear, direct and positive terms."
21
The court stated that an agency could consider a false statement to
be made "within its jurisdiction" in the meaning of Section 1001 only
when exercising (1) "the power to allow the privilege or to grant the
award" desired or (2) "the power to enact binding regulatory require-
ments and determine if, and to what extent, an individual comes
within the regulatory proscriptions." 22 FBI criminal investigations
would thus not be included, since only the trier of fact can finally de-
termine whether an individual is criminally liableaa The Eighth Cir-
Cir. 1968), petition for cert. filed, June 6, 1968, 37 U.S.L.W. 3059, in which the court
held that materiality need not be proved in a case involving oral and written statements
before the Immigration and Naturalization Service. See also United States v. McCue, 301
F.2d 452, 456 (2d Cir. 1962).
18. United States v. Allen, 193 F. Supp. 954 (S.D. Cal. 1961). The court held that
the statements involved, which had been made before a grand jury, were not made to
an "agency" within the ambit of Section 1001. See also Terry v. United States, 131 F.2d 40
(8th Cir. 1942), which held that statements on loan applications to institutions insured
by the FHA were not made to a government agency until the FHA had actually taken
some action in regard to the loan. There is no real question that in its civil functions
the FBI qualifies as an "agency" and could, for instance, legitimately use Section 1001
against a contractor who submitted false information on his bid to supply the FBI with
materials, etc. See United States v. Stark, 131 F. Supp. 190 (D. Md. 1955), which includes
an extensive discussion of the origin of the FBI and its role in criminal investigations.
19. 374 F.2d 363 (8th Cir. 1967).
20. 374 F.2d at 365.
21. 374 F.2d at 367, 369.
22. 374 F.2d at 369.
23. Several other decisions have dealt with the proper breadth to be given "jurisdic.
tion" in Section 1001. United States v. Moore, 185 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1950), held a false
statement in an investigation under the Fair Labor Standards Act was not covered by
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cuit's opinion seems accurately to reflect Congress' motivation in en-
acting Section 1001. For society is more concerned that the final deci-
sion of agencies be free from errors than that all information given to
investigators be true.
The Adler opinion argued that a false complaint leading to an un-
necessary investigation "perverts"24 the operations of the FBI and
wastes its resources. The court felt that Section 1001 was enacted to
promote administrative efficiency, and found no evidence "that Con-
gress in enacting § 1001 intended to conserve the energies of only cer-
tain agencies." 25 Not only does this overlook the point, suggested by
the Friedman court, that Section 1001 was enacted to prevent only de-
ception of government agencies making final determinations on the
basis of documents alone, but the Second Circuit's balancing of this
interest against that of free access to make complaints to the FBI is
hardly compelling. Adler merely asserts that "individuals, acting inno-
cently and in good faith, will not be deterred from voluntarily giving
information or making complaints to the FBI." 20 However, the defini-
tion of the intent necessary for a conviction under Section 1001 would
hardly encourage a person to report a possible deprivation of his
rights.27 In line with the proof requirements for false complaints in
Section 1001, since the investigation was only an exploratory search to ascertain whether
the agency had jurisdiction. There are several cases holding that an investigation is not
within the meaning of "jurisdiction" in Section 1001 since the FBI does not have power
to determine whether a crime has been committed. United States v. Davey, 155 F. Supp.
157 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); United States v. Stark, 131 F. Supp. 190 (D. Md. 1955); United
States v. Levin, 133 F. Supp. 88 (D. Colo. 1955). Contra, United States v. Van Valkenberg,
157 F. Supp. 599 (D. Alas. 1958). But some employment security cases hold that false
statements on such questionnaires are within the jurisdiction of the agency involved
even if not relied on by the agency or presented directly to it. Blake v. United States,
323 F.2d 245 (8th Cir. 1963); Ogden v. United States, 303 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1952). In
Ogden an Air Force Security Questionnaire was given to a private employer, the defen-
dant was convicted although the Air Force never saw the form or took any action on
the request.
24. "The making of intentionally false statements to the FBI calculated to provoke
an investigation by that agency may cause more 'perversion' of authorized agency func-
tions-and more harm to individuals-than false pecuniary and property claims which
are clearly covered by the statute." 380 F.2d 917, 922. The Second Circuit's use of "per-
version" is a misreading of the Supreme Court's comment in United States v. Gilliland
that Section 1001 showed Congressional intent "to protect the authorized function of
governmental departments and agencies from the perversion that might result from
the deceptive practices employed." 312 US. 86, 93 (1941). While the Second Circuit
sees the unnecessary investigation as the "perversion," the Gilliland opinion had only
mentioned this point to show that a government agency's functions have been perverted
when it is deceived in making determinations besides those involving governmental
pecuniary or property loss.
25. 380 F.2d at 922.
26. Id.
27. No evil intent need be alleged and only the making of the statement and its
known falsity need be shown. See Hirsch v. Immigration and Naturalization Service.
308 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1962), which holds that since Section 1001 requires no proof of
evil intent, conviction under it does not necessarily indicate conviction of a crime insolv-
161
The Yale Law Journal
various state statutes28 and those suggested by the Model Penal Code, 2
the courts80 should also require, at the very least, the specific intent to
start an investigation of a third party.81
ing moral turpitude which could justify an alien's deportation. See also McBride v.
United States, 225 F.2d 249, 253 (5th Cir. 1955); United States v. Uram, 148 F.2d 187,
190 (2d Cir. 1945); United States v. Lohman, 127 F. Supp. 432 (S.D. Ohio 1953). The Adler
opinion itself suggests a further criterion: that the false statement be "calculated to
provoke an investigation by" the FBI, but the court used this phrase to describe the
particular facts, and said that the statute in general required only that the defendant
knew his words to be false. 380 F.2d at 920.
28. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 150 (1957); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-744 (Supp.
1957); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 946.41(2)(b) (1958). The Maryland provision ("with intent to
deceive and with intent to cause an investigation or other action to be taken as a
result thereof') and the Nebraska law ("with the intent to instigate an Investigation of
an alleged criminal matter, or to impede an investigation of an actual criminal matter')
are examples of the specificity of these statutes. A general discussion of some of the statutes
in this area can be found in Broeder, Silence and Perjury Before Police Officers: An
Examination of the Criminal Law Risks, 40 NEB. L. Rv. 63 (1960).
29. The Model Penal Code covers "Unsworn Falsification to Authorities" in Section
241.3:
(I) In General. A person commits a misdemeanor if, with purpose to mislead a
public servant in performing his official function, he:
(a) makes any written false statement which he does not believe to be true; or
(b) purposely creates a false impression in a written application for any pecuniary
or other benefit, by omitting information necessary to prevent statements therein
from being misleading; or
(c) submits or invites reliance on any writing which he knows to be forged, altered
or otherwise lacking in authenticity; or
(d) submits or invites reliance on any sample, specimen, map, boundary-mark, or
other object which he knows to be false.
(2) Statements "Under Penalty." A person commits a petty misdemeanor If he
makes a written false statement which he does not believe to be true, on or pursuant
to a form bearing notice, authorized by law, to the effect that false statements made
therein are punishable.
(3) Perjury provisions applicable. Subsections (3) to (6) of Section 241.1 apply to
the present section.
Section 241.4. False Alarms to Agencies of Public Safety.
A person who knowingly causes a false alarm of fire or other emergency to be
transmitted to or within any organization, official or volunteer for ealing with
emergencies involving danger to life or property commits a misdemeanor.
Section 241.5. False Reports to Law Enforcement Authorities.
(1) Falsely Incriminating Another. A person who knowingly gives false infornatlon
to any law enforcement officer with purpose to implicate another commits a mis.
demeanor.
(2) Fictitious Reports. A person commits a petty misdemeanor if he:
(a) reports to law enforcement authorities an offense or other incident within their
concern knowing that it did not occur; or
(b) pretends to furnish such authorities with information relating to an offense
or incident when he knows he has no information relating to such offence or Incident.
American Law Institute, Model Penal Code (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (emphasis
except title headings supplied).
30. The courts have already begun the process of tightening the intent requirements
of Section 1001. Cf. United States v. Jaben, 224 F. Supp. 603 fW.D. Mo. 1963), aff'd, 349
F.2d 913 (8th Cir. 1965). One decision implies that specific intent to deceive must be
proved: United States v. United States Cartridge Co., 95 F. Supp. 384, 395 (E.D. Mo. 1950),
aff'd, 198 F.2d 456 (8th Cir. 1952).
31. Protecting third parties from investigations instigated by false complaints is a
justification often advanced for the use of Section 1001 to sanction false reports. While such
protection is a commendable goal, Section 1001 is an inept tool to this end. The third
party has no standing to instigate the suit, which is instead the government's preroga.
tive, and there is no guarantee that persons harassed by FBI investigations are ones
162
Vol. 78: 156, 1968
Obscene Harpies and Foul Buzzards?
The danger of Adler's application of Section 1001 to false com-
plaints to the FBI, particularly if the section is not qualified by a re-
quirement of specific intent, is made apparent by Friedman in which
the defendant was convicted for a complaint of police brutality which
was held to be false. Clearly the enforcement of federally-guaranteed
rights will be hampered if citizens hesitate to bring forward com-
plaints of possible deprivations of their rights out of fear that they
might face prosecutions in which they will have to prove the truth of
the circumstances which they had originally asked the FBI to investi-
gate.32 While it is unlikely that the FBI would initiate Section 1001
prosecutions to the extent of drying up all its sources of information,33
the existence of this discretion emphasizes the possibility that the stat-
ute may be abused by discriminatory enforcement depending on local
prejudice or generalized dislike of certain groups.34
III. False Statements During Investigations
The Adler decision raises a yet more unpleasant specter, however,
in its expansive view of the use of Section 1001 to punish inaccurate
statements made during FBI investigations. Unfortunately, the Adler
case is not alone in the suggestion. In Brandow v. United States,3a the
defendant was successfully prosecuted under Section 1001 for signing
a statement before Internal Revenue Service Special Agents (whose in-
vestigative function parallels that of the FBI) denying that he had of-
fered to disclose the government's tax evasion case against a third per-
son. At the time, the defendant was the center of an investigation on
this issue. There apparently was no prosecution of the defendant for
any substantive crime, yet he was convicted of a felony under Section
whom the government will move speedily to protect. In addition, suits for libel or
malicious prosecution under state statutes already provide remedies for such third parties.
See p. 169 infra. This need for court-supplied specific intent merely provides a further
example of the strained interpretations of Section 1001 necessary to conform it to
use in FBI criminal investigations.
32. The Friedman case illustrates the burden being placed on complainants. Although
the officer admitted that he had scuffled with the defendant and that the defendant had
noticeable injuries, the jury nevertheless found the complaint to be knowingly false.
33. This concern of the FBI would be particularly apparent in those cases, often
consensual crimes such as vice and narcotics prosecutions, in which a strong informer
network is seen by law enforcement officials as vital. Cf. J. SroLirrC, Jusnce Wm-our
TRAL ch. 6 (1966).
34. Negroes complaining of a deprivation of their civil rights or members of politi-
cally or socially deviant groups (such as war protestors or "flower children") suffering
official harassment, might be deterred by such possibilities from pressing for federal
enforcement of their rights.
55. 268 F.2d 559 (9th Cir. 1959).
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1001 for denying his guilt. The court specifically declined" to follow
the reasoning of United States v. Levin3T and United States v. Stark,80
both of which hold that such "exculpatory no's" cannot be defined as
"statements" under an investigative agency's "jurisdiction" under
Section 1001. The suggestion of the Brandow holding and the Adler
dictum that false statements of witnesses and denials of guilt by pro-
spective defendants can lead to felony convictions under Section
1001, 39 not only goes against legislative history but in many circum-
stances may contravene recent Supreme Court decisions on self-in-
crimination.
Congress has sharply limited the power of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, compared with other federal investigating units, 40 to
administer oaths during inquiries and to sanction false statements
through the perjury laws.41 The possibilities for entrapment which are
inherent in the Adler view of Section 1001 suggest that these limita-
36. Id. at 564.
37. 133 F. Supp. 88 (D. Colo. 1953).
38. 131 F. Supp. 190 (D. Md. 1955).
39. Underlying much of the concern about the use of Section 1001 in criminal investi.
gations is the harsh penalty possible under its terms, which might almost rise to the level
of "cruel and unusual punishment." Prosecutors are not immune to this concern. One
former Assistant U.S. Attorney has written of the lengths to which his office went to
find alternative statutes to prosecute persons who made certain false statements but did
not deserve a felony conviction. In one case it used a state statute in connection with
the Federal Assimilative Crimes Act. Kaplan, Prosecutorial Discretion-A Comment, 60
Nw. U.L. Rav. 174, 189 (1965). There is no guarantee, of course, that other prosecutors
will be so inventive.
The sanctions in Section 1001 are heavier than those provided by either the similar
state statutes or federal perjury law. The federal Section 1001 allows a maximum of five
years' imprisonment, for example, while the most severe state penalty, Wisconsin's, pro-
vides for one year's imprisonment. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 946.41(l) (1958). The federal perjury
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1964), allows a five year prison term, but the maximum fine is
only $2000, compared with Section 1001's $10,000 limit. Section 1001's provision for heavy
punishment, together with lower proof requirements in comparison to the perjury laws,
accounts for at least one prosecutor's substituting use of Section 1001 for the customary
perjury charge in connection with false statements made under oath in the case. United
States v. Stark, 131 F. Supp. 190 (D. Md. 1955). The "two.oath rule"-that at least two
affidavits alleging perjury are necessary in a perjury prosecution-does not apply to
Section 1001 cases. Fisher v. United States, 254 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1958); see also United
States v. McCue, 301 F.2d 542 (2d Cir. 1962).
40. United States v. Levin, 133 F. Supp. 88 (D. Colo. 1953), catalogues the far wider
powers of other government agencies to administer oaths, grounded in 5 U.S.C. § 303
(1964), as amended (Supp. II, 1966).
41. The FBI does have the power to administer oaths when it investigates "attempts
to defraud the United States, or any irregularity or misconduct of an employee or
agent of the United States." 5 U.S.C. § 303 (1964), as amended (Supp. II, 1966), which is
applied to the FBI by 28 U.S.C. § 535(a) (1964), as amended (Supp. II, 1966). But this
power does not extend to the agency's general criminal investigations. The administration
of an oath prior to a confession may be held to be so coercive on the suspect as to
exclude the confession from the subsequent trial. F. INaAU & J. REID, CRIMINAL INTER-
ROGATION AND CONFESSIONs, 203-04 (2d ed. 1967) [hereinafter cited as INDAU & REID]. One
commentator advocates the suspension of all oath administration, arguing that It Is an
anachronistic practice incompatible with democratic society and modern rationality.
Silving, The Oath, 68 YALE L.J. 1527, 1576-77 (1959). See note 66 infra.
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tions on the FBI are sensible and should be read into Section 1001.
In fact, they should apply to the use of Section 1001 by all government
units conducting investigations and particularly those conducting
criminal investigations. 42 Many factors make the use of Section 1001
against a witness both unwise and unfair. When an FBI agent takes a
witness's statement, the state has deliberately created a situation in
which the person interrogated may desire only to rid himself quickly
of the investigator and any connection with the investigation.43 He is
seeking nothing from the FBI in contrast to a person requesting a li-
cense or paycheck from a federal agency. The FBI has sought him out;
he may make a false statement simply to prevent future demands on
his time. Particularly in the case of a witness, an agent may urge the
person to talk and may attempt to disparage any harm that might re-
sult to the witness from his statements; an agent in these circumstances
could easily enhance a witness's possible inclination to lie."
The untoward effect which Section 1001 would have on witnesses is
further exacerbated when suspects are being interrogated. The use of
the false statements statute to prosecute suspects runs clearly contrary
to high court decisions recognizing a suspect's right to refuse to answer
incriminating questions during investigations, in the absence of an
immunity statute or valid waiver of fifth amendment rights.4 5 Section
1001 carries the implication in such situations that the suspect has a
42. Cf. note 47 infra.
43. The Second Circuit, in United States v. Bulfalino, 285 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1960).
stated unanimously:
even an otherwise law-abiding citizen who is stopped and interrogated by the police.
and who is given no reason for his detention and questioning. may feel it is his
right to give as little information as possible and even perhaps to respond evasively
if he believes he might thereby be earlier rid of police inquiry. That others may at
times go to the brink of truth, or beyond, is likely, particularly when . . . they
know that the existing law does not require them to give a truthful account to
police offiers.
285 F.2d at 415. Cf. United States v. Davey, 155 F. Supp. 175. 178 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
44. Cf. Duke, Prosecution for Attempts to Evade Income Tax: A Discordant View of a
Procedural Hybrid, 76 YALE L.J. 1 (1966). See also INIAU & REID 119.-23, on techniques
of interviewing witnesses in general, including the necessity of minimizing their fears of
possible retaliation for their cooperation with law enforcement agencies. Faculty Note. A
Postscript to the Miranda Project: Interrogation of Draft Protestors, 77 YALE L.J. 300
(1967), describes some of these techniques in practice. The normal Section 1001 prosecu-
tion is for false statements made on government forms which, although not filled out
under oath, bear a printed warning of the statutory penalties for false statements, but
neither the oath nor the printed warning exists in the case of an oral FBI interview.
Under civil law practice oaths are not administered during criminal investigations "to
protect the declarant not only against the danger of criminal prosecution for perjury. but
also against being required to relate 'events in which he played a more or less odious
role."' Silving, supra note 41, at 1535-36.
45. See In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330 (1957). Cf. Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420 (1960),
upholding various investigative procedures of the Civil Rights Commission. while point-
ing out that the procedures would be unconstitutional in an adjudicative hearing.
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duty to confess his guilt, on a possibly vague charge, during the initial
interview.46 While the elaborate safeguards necessary to assure that
only voluntary statements are obtained by the police need not attach
before a criminal investigation has focused on a suspect,4 7 it would be
a major departure to subject such statements to the "hundred-percent
truthfulness" standard of Section 1001.
A number of cases suggest the seriousness of this danger in any dero-
gation, caused by the use of Section 1001, of a suspect's right to answer
or refuse to answer any questions as he chooses. For example, in Uni-
ted States v. Levin'48 the trial court dismissed the section of the indict-
ment involving Section 1001 in which the defendant had been accused
of falsely denying any knowledge of an emerald ring during an FBI
interrogation:
Any person who failed to tell the truth to the myriad of govern-
ment investigators and representatives about any matter, regard-
less how trivial, whether civil or criminal, which was within the
jurisdiction of a department or agency of the United States, would
be guilty of a crime punishable with greater severity than that of
perjury. In this case the defendant could be acquitted of the sub-
stantive charge against him and still be convicted of failing to tell
the truth in an investigation growing out of that charge, even
though he was not under oath. An inquiry might be made of any
citizen concerning criminal cases of a minor nature, or even of
civil matters of little consequence, and if he wilfully falsified his
statements, it would be a violation of this statute. It is inconceiv-
able that Congress had any such intent when this portion of the
statute was enacted.
49
46. Section 1001 applies to anyone who "wilfully ... conceals or covers up" a material
fact, as well as to one making false statements (emphasis added).
47. Cf. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US. 436, 439 n.7 (1966); INDAU 6 REID 182-83. The
problems here are accentuated by the mixed functions of many government Investigating
units; for example, an FTC or IRS agent may ask questions and request information on
the grounds of the need to develop a study of general conditions in a given industry or on
a tax matter, and then use the information to initiate a prosecution against the indi-
vidual. See Hanna v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420 (1960); Pollock, Pre-Complaint Investigations by
the Federal Trade Commission, 45 CHi. B. REC. 379, 380 (1964); Note, The Distinction
Between Informing and Prosecutorial Investigations: A Functional Justification for "Star
Chamber" Proceedings, 72 YA L.J. 1227 (1963); Duke, Prosecution for Attempts to Evade
Income Tax: A Discordant View of a Procedural Hybrid, 76 YALE L.J. 1 (1966). But see
Newman, Due Process, Investigations and Civil Rights, 8 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 735 (1961).
The-FBI actually presents an easier case for, unlike the FTC and IRS, it only investi-
gates, then turns the information it has gathered over to the United States Attorney or
other government official for prosecution. See United States v. Stark, 131 F. Supp. 190(D.
Md. 1955); Hoover, Role of the FBI in the Federal Employee Security Program, 49 Nw.
U.L. REv. 333 (1954); Hoover, The Civil Investigations of the FBI, I SYRAcusc L. REv.
380 (1950); Powers, FBI Investigations, 65 Com. L.J. 326 (1960).
48. 133 F. Supp. 88 (D. Colo. 1953).
49. 133 F. Supp. at 90. Other cases involving such denials of guilt contain similar
rationales. See United States v. Stark, 131 F. Supp. 190 (D. Md. 1955) (defendant falsely
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It is unfortunate that this rejection of the use of Section 1001, when
a suspect's statement consists solely of an "exculpatory no" was disap-
proved by Adler in dicta. Moreover, even the "exculpatory no" limita-
tion is itself inadequate in that it turns on the phrasing of a question
regarding the defendant's guilt and on the number of words used in
his reply. Any distinction between a negatively phrased false statement
and an affirmatively phrased one is at best arbitrary and is most cer-
tainly not substantial enough to justify the application of Section 1001
in one case and not the other.5
0
Some discussions of Section 100151 have dismissed the dangers of its
use against false statements by suggesting that the statute could be
confined to false complaints. But the logic of applying Section 1001 to
complaints must lead to its application to statements generally since it
is nearly impossible to distinguish the two or to justify a distinction.
It has been suggested that false complaints cause greater harm and are
motivated most clearly by an evil intent. But a false complaint may
start an investigation that is quickly ended; a false statement during
an investigation could easily balloon it unwarrantably to include in-
nocent people and wasted manhours. And a wilfully false statement
may be motivated by an intent as evil as that behind a false complaint.
The key issue is whether Section 1001 ought to be used during crimi-
nal investigations at all.
denied involvement in a bribery attempt of an official of the Federal Housing Authority);
United States v. Davey, 155 F. Supp. 175 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (defendant v,'as indicted for
denying to FBI agents that he had used an alias when registering under the Selective
Service Act); Paternostro v. United States, 311 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1962) (defendant denied
involvement in New Orleans police graft in interview with Internal Revenue Service
Special Agent); United States v. Phinippe, 173 F. Supp. 582 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (defendant
denied to IRS Special Agent that he had received unreported "kick- back" income for
making hotel supply purchases). Contra, Brandow v. United States, 268 F.2d 559 (9th Cir.
1959).
50. For example, is it justifiable to convict a man who, beig asked '"You don't know
who committed this crime, do you? answers "Yes, that's right (an affirmative statement).
but not one who when asked "Do you know who committed this crime?' say "No, I
don't" (an exculpatory no). Or is there any rational basis to differentiate between these
three false answers to "Did you meet Joe on the comer last Wednesday?": A) "No." B) "I
don't know Joe." or C) "I was at my mother's house Wednesday afternoon."
And what of the "exculpatory yes?" For instance, if an FBI agent questions a young
man suspected of turning in his draft card, "Do you have your card on your per.on?"
and is falsely told "Yes," has Section 1001 been violated, while it would not have been
had the agent asked, "Did you turn in your card?" and was falsely told "No."
There are positions on either side of the "exculpatory no" rationale as wel. On the
one hand, the Second Circuit would include all of the above hypotheticals as "statements"
under Section 1001, United States v. McCue, 301 F.2d 452 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S.
939 (1962), and on the other, the district court in United States v. Allen, 193 F. Supp.
954 (S.D. Cal. 1961), held that any answer to a question is not a "statement" (alternative
holding).
51. See Note, 14 WAYNE L. ,Ev. 642 (1968); Case Note, 37 U. Cn'c. L REv. 238 (1968);
4. Note, 5 HOUSTON L. Ray. 548 (1968).
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IV. Alternatives
Even if the section is eliminated from the investigative activities of
government agencies like the FBI, the agencies are not left wholly un-
protected. First, the desire of most citizens to cooperate with law en-
forcement officials should not be overlooked. 52 Second, false statements
on wage, employment, or other such forms would still be covered by
Section 1001. Third, other remedies are open to both the FBI and in-
nocent individuals who are injured by false statements or complaints.
For example, the federal misprision of felony statute punishes "who-
ever, having knowledge of the actual commission of a felony" under
federal law "conceals and does not as soon as possible make known the
same [to a] person in civil or military authority under the United
States."' 3 Although a mere failure to inform is not an offense," the
statute has been applied to one who deliberately induces "cover inves-
tigations" or makes misleading statements to throw suspicion from a
known felon.55
The accessory-after-the-fact statute can also be employed to cover
assistance given to violators of any provision of the federal Criminal
Code. The statute punishes "[w]hoever, knowing that an offense
against the United States has been committed, receives, relieves, com-
forts or assists the offender in order to hinder or prevent his apprehen-
sion, trial or punishment. " 56 False statements to investigating officers
have been found to constitute active aid.
57
When more than one person is involved, the federal statute punish-
ing conspiracies to "commit an offense" against the United States or to
52. Cf. Broeder, supra note 28, at 103.
53. 18 U.S.C. § 4 (1964).
54. See, e.g., Bratton v. United States, 73 F.2d 795 (10th Cir. 1934).
55. In Neal v. United States, 102 F.2d 643 (8th Cir. 1939), the fact that the defendant
had given federal investigating officers misleading statements was grounds for the jury
to infer that the defendant failed to disclose the details of the crime within his knowl-
edge. A new trial was ordered in Neal because the government failed to prove active
concealment of evidence, an essential element under the misprision of felony statute,
Id. at 650.
56. 18 U.S.C. § 3 (1964).
57. Hiram v. United States, 354 F.2d 4 (9th Cir. 1965). There are also three obstruction
of justice sections in the Criminal Code, 18 U.S.C. § 111 (1964) ("Assaulting, resisting
or impeding certain officers or employees'); 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (1964) ("Influencing or
injuring officer, juror or witness generally"); 18 U.S.C. § 1501 (1964) ('Assault on process
server'). But judicial construction has foreclosed their use because physical force is
required, Long v. United States, 199 F.2d 717, 719-20 (4th Cir. 1952); because a judicial
tribunal must be directly involved, United States v. Bulfalino, 285 F.2d 408, 416 (2nd Cir.
1960) (FBI agents not a judicial tribunal); and because a mere false statement to an officer
has been explicitly held insufficient, Miller v. United States, 230 F.2d 486 (5th Cir. 1956).
The court commented that the perjury statute, with its stringent proof requirements,
should suffice. A useful discussion of these statutes is contained in Broeder, supra note 28,
at 69-80.
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"defraud the United States" is available.58 The phrase "defraud the
United States" has been so broadly defined under this section that sep-
arate prosecutions of those conspiring to make false statements are pos-
sible on the fraud count alone." The FBI can also obtain the protection
of the perjury laws through its power to administer oaths in investiga-
tions involving "frauds on, or attempts to defraud the government, or
any irregularity or misconduct of any officer or agent of the United
States."60 In addition to these substantive offenses, the information-
gathering interest of the prosecution is protected by the subpoena
power available to the grand jury and at the preliminary hearing.
The individual who might be needlessly implicated in a government
inquiry because of a false complaint or statement also has statutory
protection in the form of libel and malicious prosecution laws. Al-
though these statutes afford private remedies under the laws of the
various states, they would nevertheless act as deterrents to reckless in-
volvement of persons in federal investigations. For example, a recent
Wisconsin case, Otten v. Schutt,6' allowed compensatory and punitive
damages for defendant's false allegations to the police about plaintiff's
alleged shoplifting. The statement was held to be libelous; the normal
privilege given communications to police about criminal matters did
not apply because defendant intended no prosecution and must there-
fore have made the statements "maliciously." Similar statements were
held libelous in New York because the defendant lacked a "reasonable
basis" for making them.62 In the event process is issued or an arrest is
made, the injured party can also sue on a tort theory of malicious pro-
secution.a He must be able to prove that the criminal process has been
used for private purposes64 or that it has been invoked by a complaint
without probable cause.65 In all these situations, the one making the
false complaint or false statement, and not the government agency, is
held for damages.
58. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1964).
59. A recent statement of this doctrine can be found in Dennis v. United States, 384
U.S. 855, 860-61 (1966). The trend was analyzed, and deplored, in Goldstein, Conspiracy
to Defraud the United States, 68 YALE L.J. 405 (1959).
60. See note 41 supra.
61. 15 Wis. 2d 497, 113 N.W.2d 152 (1962).
62. Eisenberg v. Reasenberg, 252 N.Y. 490, 169 N.E. 656 (1930). Although the libel
suit is available in these false complaint or false statement situations whenever special
damages can be shown, the statements are libel per se only when the), allege the defamed
person was involved in an indictable offense or one involving moral turpitude. I F.
HARPER & F. JA.m, THE LAW OF TORTS § 5.10 at 376 (1956).
63. 1 F. HARPER & F. JAmEs, THE LAW OF TORTS § 4.11 at 337 (1956).
64. See, e.g., Byers v. Ward, 368 Pa. 416, 84 A.2d 307 (1951) (effort to gain coal lease);
Peters v. Hall, 263 Wis. 450, 57 N.V.2d 723 (1953) (effort to collect debt).
65. Rupp v. Summerfield, 161 Cal. App. 2d 657, 326 P.2d 912 (1958) (grand theft
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The existence of this arsenal has a double significance. It creates
further doubt that the Congress meant to include unsworn statements
to investigate agencies under the heavy sanctions of Section 1001. And
even if the statutory history be deemed ambiguous on that issue, these
alternative statutes make even more dubious the wisdom of wholesale
judicial expansion of Section 1001 to include false complaints and
false statements made during criminal investigations.
V. Conclusion
While, as a moral proposition, society generally disapproves of lying,
and lying to officers of the government may be a valid concern of the
law, Section 1001 was not designed to address the problem of false
statements made to a government investigator during the investigation
of a crime. Use of the statute in such situations creates problems that
are too serious66 to allow such an expansion without an explicit man-
date from Congress. Federal prosecutions, therefore, should be re-
stricted to substantive criminal offenses, and the government should
not be allowed to charge citizens with felonies simply because federal
officials expend resources investigating questionable complaints or
acting on doubtful answers to questions.
If a criminal sanction is thought necessary for a limited range of spe-
cific situations, it should be more sharply focused than Section 1001
presently is. It should be limited, through a requirement of specific
intent, to circumstances where the person making the statement or
complaint is both aware of its falsity and is lying in order to bring
about an investigation of an innocent third party.67 There also appears
to be no reason for the crime to be more than a misdemeanor. Finally,
the investigator should be required to impress the person being inter-
charge); Jackson v. Beckham, 217 Cal. App. 2d 264, 31 Cal. Rptr. 739 (1963) (petty theft
charge); Sims v. Union News Co., 284 App. Div. 335, 131 N.Y.S.2d 837 (1954) (assault
complaint).
66. One of the important considerations underlying the issues raised in this Note was
raised by Silving, in her discussion of the perjury laws:
The present tendency to increase perjury penalties and relax the materiality require.
ment has resulted from the policy of "government think." This policy is based on theassumption that the state has an abstract right to man's "truth"-a right that is
not dependent on any concrete social interest calling for protection. This assumption
militates against the basic democratic tenet that the state is not the keeper of Its
subjects' consciences. Unless a clear social interest can be shown to exist, the state
should not punish a man for abstract lying. And the punishment for lying should be
proportionate to the social harm it produces.
Silving, The Oath, 68 YALE L.J. 1527, 1576-77 (1959).
67. See, e.g., the proposals of the American Law Institute, supra note 29.
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viewed with the possibility of criminal liability through a warning-
differing slightly from the Miranda warning-that "anything you say
which is untrue may constitute a crime."
68. This would serve the same deterrent function as the warning which already
appears on the forms of the government agencies which use Section 1001 to protect their
decision-making. Since the severity of the penalties is explained by the role of the statute
as deterrent, the unannounced use of Section 1001 by the FBI is not only unauthorized
but fails to achieve the law's real aim. For legislative history on this point, see the
comments of Rep. McKeown, supra note 12.
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